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A standard assumption in the literature on judicial behavior holds that 
decisions of multimember courts conform to the preferences of the median 
judge. Judges and scholars have suggested, however, that contrary to the 
predictions of the median voter theorem, the judge with the power to 
assign the panel opinion wields disproportionate influence over case 
outcomes. In this article, we investigate whether the “assignment power” 
systematically affects outcomes on three-judge panels in the 13 federal 
circuits. We identify which judge presides over the panel in more than 
126,000 cases across all circuits between 1993 and 2007. We exploit cross-
circuit variation in the allocation of the assignment power to disentangle 
the effect of assignment from other attributes of presiding judges. We find 
that the judge who wields the assignment power is significantly less likely 
than other judges to dissent—an indication that assigning judges are more 
likely to be satisfied with the case outcome. We find evidence that 
assigning judges influence case outcomes through strategic assignment of 
opinions to other panel members, but no evidence that assigning judges 
influence case outcomes through strategic self-assignment of majority 
opinions. Our results suggest that decisionmaking on multimember courts 
is shaped not only by the composition of panels but also by the allocation 
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How do multimember courts bound by majoritarian decisional rules reach the 
outcomes that they do? A standard assumption in the academic literature is that the 
judge whose preferences lie at the middle of the ideological distribution (the “median” 
judge) determines the ultimate result (Black, 1948). As three leading scholars of judicial 
behavior put it, “virtually all social scientists” agree that—at least under “certain 
conditions and voting procedures”—“the median can serve as an appropriate way to 
characterize the preferences of ‘the Court’ and the outcomes it reaches” (Martin, Quinn, 
and Epstein, 2004, p. 1278). However, judges themselves ascribe enormous influence to 
the judge with the power to assign the panel opinion, who is not necessarily the median 
judge on the ideological distribution (e.g., Fortas, 1975). In a now-public 1972 
memorandum, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas alleged that Chief Justice 
Warren Burger used his assignment power “to keep control of the merits” in a high-
profile case (Wahlbeck, 2006, p. 1730).1 Likewise, Harold Medina, a longtime judge on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, once wrote that “the ultimate and 
definitive decision in a particular case” may depend “in no small measure” on how the 
presiding judge wields the assignment power (Medina, 1961, p. 152). 
In this study, we investigate the ways in which allocation of the assignment 
power among panel members affects decisionmaking in the U.S. federal courts of 
appeals. Cases in the federal courts of appeals are decided by three-judge panels, with 
one of the panel members designated as the “presiding judge.” The chief judge of the 
circuit is the presiding judge any time that she sits on a panel; otherwise, the most 
senior active judge on the panel presides (28 U.S.C. § 45(b)). In all but one of the circuits, 
the presiding judge assigns the panel opinion whenever she is in the majority. In five of 
the circuits, the presiding judge also assigns the panel opinion when she is in dissent. 
We exploit variation in the allocation of the assignment power across circuits to 
                                                      
1 Douglas made the quoted claim in the context of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and leveled a similar 
allegation in the context of the less widely known free speech case Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972) (Wahlbeck 2006, pp. 1730-31). 
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disentangle the effect of assignment power on case outcomes from other effects 
associated with presiding judge status. 
Studying the assignment power on the federal courts of appeals can shed light 
on important aspects of judicial behavior for four reasons. First, the identity of the 
assigning judge on the federal courts of appeals is much more variable than on the 
Supreme Court: hundreds of judges have wielded the assignment power on different 
federal court of appeals panels over the past several decades, while only four 
individuals have served as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court since 1953. Moreover, 
the same judge may be the presiding judge on one court of appeals panel and not the 
next, depending on the composition of each panel and the relative seniority of its 
members. This institutional feature allows us to examine whether the same judge 
behaves differently depending on whether she has the opportunity to wield the 
assignment power. 
Second, the judge with first claim to the assignment power on the federal courts 
of appeals is not always (indeed, usually not) the chief judge of the relevant circuit. In 
all but one of the circuits, the chief judge wields the assignment power only with 
respect to panels on which she sits. As a result, the federal court of appeals setting 
allows us to disentangle the effect of the assignment power from the effect of the chief 
judge. By contrast, in the Supreme Court setting, there is likely no credible way to 
separate the influence that the chief justice exerts by virtue of being the leader of the 
institution from the influence that the chief justice wields through the assignment 
power. 
Third, the federal courts of appeals are a worthy subject of study in their own 
right because of the extraordinary impact they have on the development of American 
law. The federal courts of appeals resolve thousands of cases each year, whereas in 
recent years the U.S. Supreme Court has issued fewer than 100 merits opinions per 
term. Oftentimes it is a federal court of appeals, not the Supreme Court, that speaks the 
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last word on a case of national significance.2 Understanding how these courts arrive at 
the outcomes they do is an important question even if the findings are not generalizable 
to the Supreme Court.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, variation across circuits in the allocation 
of the assignment power allows us to explore whether and how institutional rules and 
practices shape the decisions reached by majoritarian bodies. We employ a novel 
strategy for determining whether subtle differences in decisional norms across 
multimember bodies concretely affect the outcomes those bodies reach. While our study 
focuses on the U.S. federal court of appeals setting, our findings are potentially 
generalizable to other multimember courts as well as non-judicial committees that 
express their conclusions through reasoned single-author opinions (e.g., multimember 
administrative agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
To study the assignment power, we compiled data on the outcome of every 
federal court of appeals case in which an opinion was issued from 1993 to 2007. We 
matched these data to information on judges, including their status as chief, active, and 
senior in each month. For each case, we determined the members of the panel, which 
member was the presiding judge, how each member voted, and which member wrote 
the majority opinion.3 
We first consider whether the status of presiding judge increases the likelihood 
that a panel member will achieve an outcome that is satisfactory from her own 
perspective. We use a revealed preference measure of outcome satisfaction: whether the 
                                                      
2 For recent examples of particular prominence, see Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
affirmed by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), in which the Fifth Circuit struck down Obama 
administration executive actions regarding undocumented immigrants; and Washington v. Trump, 847 
F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld an order blocking implementation of the 
Trump Administration’s ban on entry from seven predominantly Muslim countries. 
3 Not every opinion has an identifiable author: 20% of cases in our sample result in “per curiam” opinions 
(i.e., opinions issued in the name of the court rather than a particular judge). We include per curiam 
opinions in our analysis and discuss their implications below. 
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judge dissents from the majority.4 We find that presiding judges are less likely than 
other judges on the panel to dissent, which suggests that the presiding judge is indeed 
more likely to achieve what she considers to be a satisfactory outcome. This finding 
remains robust to the inclusion of control variables for chief judge status and relative 
experience of panel members. 
We next exploit variation across circuits in the allocation of the assignment 
power to disentangle the effect of assignment from other effects attributable to 
presiding judge status. We find strong evidence that the assignment power decreases 
the likelihood that a presiding judge dissents. In particular, the probability that the 
presiding judge will dissent is lower in circuits in which the presiding judge wields the 
assignment power than in the one circuit that allocates the assignment power 
differently. We also compare circuits in which presiding judges hold a stronger form of 
the assignment power (ability to assign the panel opinion in every case) to circuits in 
which the assignment power is weaker (ability to assign the panel opinion only when 
the presiding judge is in the majority). We find that presiding judges who enjoy a 
stronger form of the assignment power are less likely to dissent. 
Finally, we consider pathways through which presiding judges may exert 
influence over case outcomes via the assignment power. One possibility is that 
presiding judges with power over opinion assignment shape outcomes by assigning 
opinions to themselves, which allows them to assert agenda control through the opinion 
draft. Another possibility is that presiding judges who wield the assignment power 
strategically assign opinions to co-panelists. We find no indication of strategic self-
assignment, but we do find evidence suggesting that presiding judges with power over 
opinion assignment influence case outcomes through strategic assignment of opinions 
to other panel members. Specifically, we find that presiding judges with the assignment 
power are less likely than other judges to dissent from panel opinions when not the 
                                                      
4 In the Appendix, we also report results using a broader definition of disagreement: whether the judge 
dissents or writes separately from the majority in a concurring opinion. Our substantive results are 
consistent across both definitions of disagreement.  
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majority opinion author. In other words, presiding judges with the assignment power 
appear to be more satisfied with the panel opinions written by others. 
This article builds on a literature that studies the influence of opinion assignment 
on judicial outcomes in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., Ulmer, 1970; 
Slotnick, 1979; Brenner and Spaeth, 1986; Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 1996; Wahlbeck, 
2006; Bonneau et al., 2007; Lax and Cameron, 2007). The one empirical study that 
examines patterns of opinion assignment in the federal courts of appeals focuses 
specifically on the outcomes of sexual harassment cases (Farhang et al., 2015). We are, to 
our knowledge, the first to exploit differences across circuits in rules for allocating the 
assignment power, and the first to investigate the effect of the assignment power on 
case outcomes at the court of appeals level across a full range of issue areas. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses ways in which allocation 
of the assignment power among panel members might affect case outcomes. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 
discusses the implications of our results and concludes.   
 
2.  BACKGROUND AND THEORY  
 This section focuses on ways in which the allocation of the assignment power 
among panel members may affect case outcomes. We begin by providing details 
regarding the institutional setting of the federal courts of appeals. We next discuss 
preferences and incentives of judges regarding opinion assignments, and we identify 
ways in which judges may influence case outcomes through opinion assignments. 
Finally, we articulate testable hypotheses that will allow us to distinguish among 
different causal mechanisms. 
  
Institutional Setting. Cases on the federal courts of appeals are initially heard in 
panels of three judges.5 In all circuits, one panel member is designated as the presiding 
                                                      
5 In very rare instances, a high-profile case will be heard by the full court en banc before an initial panel 
has rendered a decision. See, for example, West Virginia v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 15-
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judge, and that judge leads a discussion among panel members at a “conference” 
following oral argument. Panel members cast preliminary votes on cases at the 
conference (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer, 2014, p. 63; Cohen, 2002, p. 136). 
In all but one circuit, the presiding judge assigns the panel opinion whenever the 
presiding judge is in the majority (Cheng, 2008, p. 527 n. 35; Nash, 2014, p. 1625 n. 86). 
The one exception is the Fourth Circuit: according to that court’s internal operating 
procedures, “[o]pinion assignments are made by the Chief Judge on the basis of 
recommendations from the presiding judge of each panel on which the Chief Judge did 
not sit.” The chief judge “consult[s] with the presiding judge of each panel” regarding 
opinion assignments, but the chief judge assigns the opinion herself “with the objective 
of as even a distribution of the workload as can be achieved.”6  
The circuits also differ in how they allocate the assignment power when the 
presiding judge is in dissent. In the Fifth, Sixth,7 Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, 
the presiding judge enjoys an especially strong form of the assignment power: she 
assigns the panel opinion regardless of whether she is in the majority or in dissent. In 
the First, Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits, the presiding judge 
assigns the panel opinion only when she is in the majority. In other cases, the next 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1363 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (oral argument held Sept. 27, 2016), in which the D.C. Circuit considered 
challenges to the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan; and International Refugee Assistance v. Trump, 
No. 17-1351 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (oral argument held May 9, 2017), in which the Fourth Circuit considered 
challenges to the Trump administration’s second executive order barring entry from six predominantly 
Muslim countries. As explained below, we exclude en banc cases from our analysis.  
6 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Local Rules of the Fourth Circuit; Internal Operating 
Procedures, I.O.P. 36.1, at 32 (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/rules/LocalRules.pdf. 
One author reports that “anecdotally, the prerogative of the chief judge is rarely if ever exercised” 
(Cheng, 2008, p. 530, n. 53). However, the fact that the chief judge ultimately must approve opinion 
assignments may affect the extent to which presiding judges incorporate strategic considerations into 
their assignment recommendations. As discussed below, we do indeed find evidence suggesting that 
presiding judges there behave differently than presiding judges in other circuits who enjoy plenary 
power over opinion assignments.  
7 Sources differ in their description of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion assignment practices (Bowie, Songer, 
and Szmer, 2014, p. 67; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek, 2003, p. 91). We have confirmed on the basis 
of Sixth Circuit’s internal operating procedures as well as interviews with former clerks that opinions are 
assigned by the presiding judge on each panel. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure; Sixth Circuit Rules; Sixth Circuit Internal Operating Procedures; Sixth Circuit Guide to 
Electronic Filing, 6 Cir. I.O.P. 32.1(a)(1), at 86 (Dec. 1, 2016), http://bit.ly/2pwYvef.  
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highest-ranking judge in the majority assigns the panel opinion (Cheng, 2008, p. 527 n. 
35). 
 
 Incentives Regarding Opinion Assignment. While the norm is for panel 
members to divide up opinions roughly equally (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer, 2014, p. 
68), the number of opinions per panel is not always divisible by three, and so an 
assigning judge will sometimes have an opportunity to allocate an additional opinion to 
herself or to another panel member. In making that decision, the assigning judge faces a 
tradeoff. On the one hand, opinion writing is a potentially time-consuming task, and an 
assigning judge with a taste for leisure may have an incentive to assign the extra 
opinion to another panel member. On the other hand, writing the first draft of the panel 
opinion may present an opportunity for agenda control. The assigned author generally 
sends her first draft to co-panelists before any competing opinions are circulated, giving 
her an opportunity to structure the panel’s choice among policy alternatives and to 
direct attention toward a particular alternative. The norm that the assigned author 
circulates her draft first also may allow her to obtain early commitments from co-
panelists to join her opinion before a dissent has circulated (Wahlbeck, 2006, p. 1734). 
 Even beyond the opportunities for agenda control, judges may find some writing 
assignments to be more congenial than others (Cheng, 2008, p. 543). For example, a 
judge who was an antitrust lawyer earlier in her career may have a preference for 
writing in antitrust cases. Likewise, a writing assignment in a high-profile or precedent-
setting case may be attractive to a judge who desires public attention or subsequent 
citations. Conversely, a writing assignment in a record-intensive, fact-bound case may 
be undesirable because drafting the opinion is a laborious endeavor with little 
reputational payoff.  
Given the opportunity for agenda control that comes with writing the panel 
opinion, assigning judges may have an incentive to assign opinions in controversial 
cases to themselves. In some instances, however, the assigning judge may choose to 
assign the opinion in a controversial case to an ideologically sympathetic co-panelist 
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instead. This may be because the assigning judge already has chosen to self-assign the 
opinion in a different case, and self-assigning the opinion in a second case would result 
in a workload imbalance among panel members. Or it may be because the opinion in 
the controversial case is particularly costly to write (e.g., it involves an unusually 
lengthy record), and so the assigning judge prefers to allow another panel member to 
draft the opinion even though that entails some loss of agenda control.  
A judge who wields the assignment power also may exert influence over co-
panelists by using desirable and undesirable writing assignments as bargaining chips. 
She may be able to use her power over assignments to procure substantive concessions 
from other panel members regarding case outcomes. Even if such bargaining is not 
explicit, the assigning judge’s ability to structure the workload of her co-panelists may 
make others more deferential to the assigning judge’s preferences so that they receive 
more desirable assignments. 
 So far, we have suggested that allocation of the assignment power may affect 
case outcomes (a) because assigning judges strategically self-assign majority opinions in 
controversial cases and (b) because assigning judges strategically assign majority 
opinions to other panel members. A third way in which allocation of the assignment 
power may affect judges’ votes is specific to circuits in which the presiding judge can 
assign the majority opinion only when she herself is a member of the majority. In such 
circuits, the presiding judge may be more reluctant to dissent because she does not 
want to cede control over opinion assignment.  
Presiding judges also may sway case outcomes for reasons unrelated to the 
assignment power. First, the presiding judge is only presiding because she is (a) the 
chief judge or (b) the longest-serving judge on the panel in active status—both of which 
may be sources of influence independent of presiding judge status. Second, the 
presiding judge may wield influence over case outcomes through mechanisms other 
than self-assignment. As noted above, the presiding judge generally leads the 
discussion among panel members at conference, and the judge who leads the post-
argument discussion may enjoy an agenda-setting power distinct from the power 
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associated with opinion assignment (Cross and Lundquist, 2006, p. 1668). As explained 
below, cross-circuit differences in the allocation of the assignment  power will allow us 
to distinguish the effect of assignment from other effects of presiding judge status. 
 
 Hypotheses. Our informal analysis above suggests that a judge with the 
opportunity to assign the panel opinion may influence case outcomes through strategic 
self-assignment of opinions in controversial cases as well as strategic assignment of 
opinions to other panel members. If the judge with the assignment power influences 
case outcomes through either of these mechanisms, we expect that the assigning judge 
is more likely to be satisfied with the panel opinion—and, for that reason, less likely to 
dissent. This line of logic supports a first working hypothesis: 
 
H1: A judge with the opportunity to assign the panel opinion is less likely to 
dissent than other judges on the panel.8 
 
We also investigate the mechanisms through which judges wielding the 
assignment power exert influence over case outcomes. If the effect of the assignment 
power operates exclusively through strategic self-assignment, we would not expect a 
difference in dissent rates between judges with the strong form of the assignment 
power (i.e., the ability to assign the panel opinion whether in majority or in dissent) and 
judges with a weaker form of the assignment power (i.e., the ability to assign the panel 
opinion only when in dissent). With either the strong form or the weak form of the 
assignment power, the presiding judge has the option to self-assign when in the 
majority. If the effect of the assignment power operates through strategic assignment of 
panel opinions to ideologically sympathetic co-panelists, however, then we might 
indeed expect to see a lower dissent rate among presiding judges in strong-form circuits 
                                                      
8 We use the phrase “opportunity to assign the majority opinion” to refer to presiding judges in strong-
form and weak-form circuits. In either type of circuit, the presiding judge has an opportunity to assign 
the panel opinion even though—in weak-form circuits—she may sacrifice that opportunity by initially 
voting to dissent. 
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than in weak-form circuits. This is so because in a strong-form circuit, a presiding judge 
who is in the dissent on the initial vote still has control over opinion assignment, and 
thus can assign the panel opinion to the judge in the majority whose views are closest to 
her own. The more ideologically sympathetic co-panelist is then more likely to write a 
middle-ground opinion that ultimately leads the presiding judge to join. In a weak-form 
circuit, a presiding judge who initially indicates an intention to dissent thereby loses 
control over opinion assignment in that case. The assignment may then go to the more 
extreme co-panelist, who is less likely to write a middle-ground opinion that regains the 
support of the presiding judge. Likewise, if the effect of the assignment power is 
explained by assigning judges using opinion assignments as bargaining chips, then we 
might expect to see a lower dissent rate among presiding judges in strong-form circuits. 
This is so because a presiding judge in a strong-form circuit has control over more 
opinion assignments, and thus has more bargaining chips at her disposal. 
This logic leads to a second working hypothesis: 
 
H2: A judge with a strong form of the assignment power (i.e., power to assign the 
panel opinion whether in majority or in dissent) is less likely to dissent than a 
judge with a weak form of the assignment power (i.e., power to assign the panel 
opinion only when in the majority).    
 
 If judges with the assignment power influence case outcomes through strategic 
self-assignment, then we might expect self-assignment to be more likely in some 
circumstances than in others. When a judge assigns an opinion to herself, she 
potentially gains greater control over the case outcome, but with the cost of having to 
write an opinion. If the assigning judge is in full accord with fellow panel members, she 
may have little incentive to bear the cost of writing an additional opinion; instead, she 
can assign the opinion to an ideologically sympathetic co-panelist and save herself the 
opinion writing costs. If the assigning judge’s views differ from other panel members, 
however, she may have a stronger incentive to assign the opinion to herself—and thus 
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to exert more control over the outcome. The assigning judge’s views are most likely to 
diverge from those of other panel members when the assigning judge is in the 
ideological minority. Thus, insofar as judges with the assignment power exert influence 
over case outcomes through strategic self-assignment, we might expect judges in the 
ideological minority to be more likely to self-assign. This rationale leads to a third 
working hypothesis: 
 
H3: The effect of the assignment power on the probability of authoring the panel 
opinion is greater for a judge in the ideological minority than for a judge in the 
ideological majority. 
 
An alternative way to determine whether assigning judges exert influence over 
case outcomes through strategic self-assignment or strategic assignment of opinions to 
co-panelists is to look at votes of non-authoring judges. If the only mechanism through 
which the assigning judge influences case outcomes is through self-assigning the 
majority opinion in controversial cases, then we would not expect to see an effect of the 
assignment power in cases in which that judge is not the author of the majority opinion. 
If, however, assigning judges influence case outcomes through strategic assignment of 
panel opinions to co-panelists, then we might expect judges with the assignment power 
to join their co-panelists’ opinions at a higher rate than judges without the assignment 
power join their co-panelists. We also might expect that effect to be stronger among 
judges with a strong form of the assignment power than judges with a weak form, 
because judges with a strong form of the assignment power have a greater opportunity 
to influence outcomes through assignment of opinions to co-panelists. These rationales 
lead us to two final working hypotheses: 
 
H4: A judge with the opportunity to assign the panel opinion is less likely to 
dissent in cases in which she is not the author of the majority opinion than a 
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non-assigning judge is in cases in which she is not the author of the majority 
opinion. 
 
H5: A judge with a strong form of the assignment power is less likely to dissent 
in cases in which she is not the author of the majority opinion than a judge with 
a weak form of the assignment power is in cases in which she is not the author 
of the majority opinion.   
  
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, we describe our dataset and present descriptive statistics. Our 
dataset identifies the judges on each court of appeals case, the judge who wrote the 
majority opinion, the judges who dissented or wrote separately on each case, and the 
judge who presided over each case. The determination of which judge presided in a 
case requires information on the status of each judge on each case (i.e., chief judge, 
active judge other than the chief judge, or senior judge), and the relative seniority of the 
judges on each panel. We match information from three sources. First is data on the 
status of each court of appeals judge in each calendar month from 1993 to 2007 (chief, 
active, and senior). Second is data on each federal court of appeals case from 1993 to 
2007. Third is supplemental data on judges, including the political party of their 
appointing president.   
 
A. Data on Court of Appeals Judges  
 We have created a dataset that we use to identify which judge presided over each 
court of appeals case. The judge who presides is determined as follows. First, if the chief 
judge is on the panel, that judge presides. Second, if no chief judge is present, the active 
judge on the circuit with longest time of service presides. We began with data on judge 
appointment date, retirement date, and termination date from the Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges, maintained by the Federal Judicial Center. The directory 
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does not include information on the date that a judge became or ceased to serve as chief 
judge, so we hand-collected data on chief judges from alternative sources.9  
From this information, we first establish a panel that identifies the status of each 
court of appeals judge as chief, active, or senior in each calendar month. From these 
data, we establish who the presiding judge would be for the complete set of three-judge 
panels convened within a circuit in each calendar month.   
  
B. Court of Appeals Opinions 
To create a dataset on panel composition and case outcomes, we obtained text 
files of every court of appeals opinion published in the Federal Reporter, Third Series 
(F.3d) from 1993 to 2007.10 It is worth emphasizing that the cases contained in F.3d are 
cases that make precedent for the circuit. Non-precedential decisions are generally 
excluded from F.3d. Thus, although the federal courts of appeals usually resolve more 
than 30,000 cases on the merits each year (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
2016), opinions published in F.3d account for a fraction of all cases heard (less than one-
fifth of the total in some of the years that our study covers).   
Each case file contains the entire court opinion. The files typically follow a 
standard format, which allows us to parse the opinions and extract the following 
information for cases: (1) the judges on the case, (2) the judge who wrote the panel 
opinion, (3) any judge who dissented, (4) the date that the opinion was handed down, 
and (5) the circuit in which the case was heard. Most cases are heard by a panel entirely 
composed of judges from that circuit. Occasionally, however, federal judges from other 
courts (district judges, court of appeals judges from other circuits, and senior associate 
justices of the Supreme Court) hear cases on a circuit court by designation. Under 28 
                                                      
9 Wikipedia has compiled remarkably detailed data on the tenure of chief judges, which we cross-checked 
against chief judge identifiers in the Federal Reporter series. The rules for which judge serves as chief 
judge are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 45. When the chief judgeship becomes vacant, a successor is chosen from 
among the active judges of the circuit according to the following rule: the longest serving active judge 
under age 65 who has served for at least one year and never previously served as chief judge becomes the 
new chief. The new chief then serves for seven years or until reaching age 70, whichever comes sooner.  
10 We obtained HTML files through a website maintained by the nonprofit Public.Resource.Org. 
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U.S.C. § 45(b), a judge of another court cannot serve as presiding judge.11 We retain only 
the votes of judges who were appointed to the circuit in which the case was heard. We 
do so because a judge from another court sitting by designation faces a situation very 
different from that of a home court judge. Other scholars have found that judges sitting 
by designation exhibit distinctive voting patterns (Green and Atkins, 1978; Haire, 
Lindquist, and Songer, 2003). We also exclude en banc cases. These cases are heard in 
panels larger than three judges that almost always include the chief judge, who presides 
over the en banc court. En banc decisionmaking entails a set of strategic considerations 
independent of those that apply in the panel setting (e.g., Giles, Walker, and Zorn, 
2006).  
This leaves us with 126,224 cases, 3.1% of which had a dissenting opinion. We 
reshape the data to the vote level for judges who were appointed to the circuit, which 
leaves us with 346,463 home judge votes. Given that we exclude non-home court 
judges, there are an average of 2.7 judges per case. The percent of dissents at the vote 
level is 1.1% (3.1%/2.7 judges per case).  
An alternative approach to defining disagreement among judges would be to 
include both dissent and concurrence as an indication of disagreement. In some cases, a 
judge may disagree with the panel’s reasoning but concur because a separate line of 
reasoning leads her to the same ultimate disposition. Whether or not she reaches the 
same bottom line result (e.g., “affirm,” “remand,” “vacate”) can be less significant than 
the reasoning she applies. (Concurrences of this variety are often, but not always, 
labeled as “concurrences in part” or “concurrences in the judgment.”) In other 
circumstances, a judge may agree with the panel’s reasoning in full but may write a 
separate concurrence to raise a point not addressed by the majority (e.g., to suggest that 
                                                      
11 The one exception to this rule is that the sitting Supreme Court justice who serves as circuit justice for a 
particular circuit will preside over any panel of which she is a member. 28 U.S.C. § 45(b). This is an 
extremely rare occurrence: the most recent instance was in 2005, and resulted from the fact that Chief 
Justice John Roberts already had been a member of the panel before he was elevated from the D.C. Circuit 
to the Supreme Court. Banner v. United States, 428 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Before that, the last instance 
was in 1992, and similarly involved the elevation of an original panel member (Clarence Thomas) from 
the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court while the case was pending. Center for Auto Safety v. Federal 
Highway Administration, 956 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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a relevant precedent should be overturned or to draw attention to an argument that the 
parties failed to fully brief). We focus on dissenting opinions as a more conservative 
measure of disagreement. As a robustness check, we repeat our analyses including both 
dissent and concurrence as our outcome measure for disagreement. All of our 
substantive results are consistent across the two specifications. We report results using 
the alternative outcome measure in an Appendix.  
 
C. Descriptive Statistics  
Figure 1 plots the number of cases and votes over time. The caseload in circuit 
courts spiked during the mid-1990s to around 15,000 cases per year, and remained fairly 
constant at 6,000 cases per year during the 2000s. The number of votes is roughly three 
times the number of cases, reflecting the fact that most panels have three home court 
judges. The year-to-year changes in votes closely tracks the changes in cases, which 
suggests that the share of home court judges on cases is fairly constant over time.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 plots the dissent rate over time. During the mid-1990s, the dissent rate 
was relatively constant at around 0.9%. The rate increased to around 1.5% the late 1990s 
and remained relatively constant thereafter. Viewed in light of Figure 1, which showed 
a decrease in caseload in the late 1990s, the increase in the dissent rate could reflect the 
fact that judges tend to write a relatively flat absolute number of dissenting opinions 
each year. Thus, when the number of cases decreases, we might expect the rate of 
dissent to increase (as we observe). 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by circuit. Each column reports annual 
averages by circuit. The average number of home judges who heard at least one case in 
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a year varies considerably between circuits, from as high as an average of 42 judges on 
the Ninth Circuit to as low as 10 judges on the First Circuit. Note that this includes both 
active and senior judges. The number of cases heard also varies considerably across 
circuits, and as expected is typically higher for circuits with more judges. The number 
of average votes in a given year is less than 3 times the number of cases, which is a 
result of the majority of panels being three home judges but some panels including one 
or two judges sitting by designation. To reiterate, even though the panel minimum is 
three judges, we observe fewer than three judge votes on a case because we retain only 
votes of home judges. The dissent rate ranges from as high as an average of 3.0% on the 
Third Circuit to as low as 0.3% on the First Circuit.   
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
To assess whether judges systematically differ in their propensity to dissent, 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the dissent rate at the judge level. We observe that the 
median dissent rate is 1.5%, but a sizable fraction of judges dissent at rates above 2% 
and even 3%. The dissent rate differs by presiding status, with presiding judges 
dissenting at a rate of 1.0% compared to 1.2% for non-presiding judges. In the next 
section, we explain how we identify the effect of the assignment power on dissent. 
  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND RESULTS 
 
A. Identification  
 




݀௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܣ௜௖௧ ൅ ߠ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൅ ߟ ௜ܲ௖௧ ൅ ߛܫ௜௖௧ ൅ ߞܧ௜௧ ൅ ߰ܥ௜௧ ൅ ߢܯ௜௖ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߪ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ (1) 
 
where ݀௜௖௧ is an indicator for whether judge i dissented in case c in year t. As described 
below, P is an indicator for presiding status, A is an indicator for the assignment power, 
S is an indicator for a strong form of the assignment power, I is an indicator for a judge 
in an ideological minority on the panel, E is the experience of the judge, C is an 
indicator for the chief judge, and M is an indicator for the most experienced judge on a 
panel. In the baseline model, we control for year fixed effects ߪ௧. We enrich the model 
with judge fixed effects ߶௜, which nets out idiosyncratic differences in the propensity for 
judges to dissent. 
 We briefly discuss the construction of each of our independent variables: 
 
Presiding Judge Status (P). As prescribed by circuit rules, a judge is the 
presiding judge on the panel if she is the chief judge or, if the chief judge is not 
on the panel, if she is the longest-serving judge on the panel in active status. 
 
Assignment Power (A). A judge holds assignment power if she has authority to 
assign the panel opinion whenever she is in the majority. In all circuits other than 
the Fourth Circuit, the presiding judge holds assignment power. In the Fourth 
Circuit, the presiding judge holds assignment power only if she is the chief 
judge; otherwise, no judge on the panel holds assignment power. 
 
Strong Form of Assignment Power (S). A judge holds a strong form of the 
assignment power if she has authority to assign the panel opinion regardless of 
whether she is in the majority or she dissents. As noted above, presiding judges 
in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold the assignment 
power in strong form (P = 1; A = 1; S = 1). In the First, Second, Third, Tenth, 
Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits, the presiding judge holds assignment 




Ideological Minority (I). Using the party of the appointing president as a proxy 
for ideology, we control for whether a judge is in an ideological minority on the 
panel. To do so, we define judge i on case c as a minority judge I if she was 
appointed by a Democratic president and the other panel members were 
appointed by a Republican president, or vice versa.  
 
Experience (E). We control for the possibility that the propensity to dissent varies 
over a judge’s length of service by including a variable E, which measures the 
number of months the judge has been on the court. Experience may affect a 
judge’s propensity to dissent in a number of ways. First, knowledge of doctrine 
or understanding of interpersonal dynamics that comes with experience may 
allow a judge to exert influence over case outcomes in subtle ways. Second, with 
experience may come self-confidence, and more self-confident judges may be 
more willing to dissent from their fellow panel members. Third, judges may 
become more efficient the longer they have served, and so the cost of opinion 
writing may fall. Fourth, experience is—of course—correlated with age. Age, too, 
may affect self-confidence as well as opinion writing costs (though the direction 
of these effects is not clear).  
 
Chief Judge Status (C). We control for whether a judge is the chief judge C, 
which allows us to disentangle the effect of presiding from the effect from being 
chief. As noted above, the chief judge in every circuit always holds the 
assignment power—at least in its weaker form. One might think that chief judge 
status negatively affects the propensity to dissent because (a) the chief judge 
exerts greater influence over other panel members, (b) the chief judge feels a 
stronger institutional imperative to achieve panel unanimity, and/or (c) the 
additional responsibilities of the chief judge leave her with less time to draft 




Most Experienced Judge (M). When the chief judge is not on the panel, the 
presiding judge is the longest-serving judge on the panel in active service. Status 
as the longest-serving judge on the panel may affect the propensity of dissent for 
reasons unrelated to the assignment power. For example, the longest-serving 
judge may command the respect of co-panelists on account of her superior 
experience. We differentiate the effects of presiding judge status and status as the 
most experienced judge by including an indicator variable for the most 
experienced judge on the panel, M. Importantly, the most experienced judge on 
the panel is not necessarily the presiding judge. For example, the most 
experienced judge might not preside because the chief judge is on the same 
panel, or the most experienced judge might not preside because she has taken 
senior status. 
 
Key to our identification strategy is the fact that circuits differ in their rules for 
allocating the assignment power. Without variation in the assignment power among 
presiding judges, it would be impossible to isolate the effect of the assignment power 
from other effects associated with presiding judge status. We use two sources of 
variation. First, the Fourth Circuit, with its unique rule for opinion assignment, serves 
as a natural experiment to test the effect of presiding judge status without the 
concomitant power to assign. When a judge other than the chief judge presides in the 
Fourth Circuit, we observe the effect of presiding judge status separate from any effect 
of assignment power (P = 1; A = 0). Second, we exploit variation between circuits that 
confer a strong form of the assignment power on presiding judges and circuits that give 
presiding judges a weaker form of the assignment power.12  
The coefficients ߚ and ߠ yield the main estimates of interest. ߚ relates the 
assignment power to the probability of dissent. ߠ relates the additive effect of the 
                                                      
12 In the Fourth Circuit, the chief judge always assigns the panel opinion and so enjoys a strong form of 
the assignment power in every case that he hears (P = 1; A = 1; S = 1; C = 1). 
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stronger form of the assignment power to the probability of dissent. There are two main 
identifying assumptions. The first is that there are no other factors that are related to 
both the assignment power and dissent—aside from presiding judge status, ideological 
minority status, chief judge status, and absolute and relative experience (all of which we 
include as controls). We are unaware of any other factor that could plausibly explain the 
size of the estimated effects below. The second assumption is that, apart from the effect 
of the assignment power, the effect of presiding judge status on dissent is constant 
across circuits.13  
  
B. Effect of Presiding 
We begin in Table 2 by investigating whether presiding judge status is associated 
with a lower rate of dissent. As discussed above, this captures both the effect of the 
assignment power and the other effects of presiding. Column 1 includes year fixed 
effects. Column 2 adds judge fixed effects. Column 3 adds an indicator for the chief 
judge and an indicator for the most experienced judge on the panel. In all specifications 
we control for months of service as a federal appellate judge (E). 
  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Columns 1 to 4 indicate a strong negative relationship between presiding judge 
status and dissent, and the point estimates in the judge fixed effects models are 
remarkably consistent after controlling for chief judge status. We find that judges are 
17% less likely to dissent when they preside relative to when they do not preside (-
0.0019 in Column 4 from a baseline of 0.0114). The results also confirm the conventional 
wisdom that judges vote along party lines. In particular, a judge who is in an 
ideological minority is roughly 75% more likely to dissent (point estimate of 0.0088 
                                                      
13 That is, we assume that the effect of presiding judge status in the Fourth Circuit is the same as the effect 
of presiding judge status in every other circuit except insofar as presiding judge status confers 
assignment power outside the Fourth Circuit. 
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relative to the mean of 0.0114). The effect of chief judge status is sizeable as well, 
representing a 12% lower probability of dissent relative to the judge’s lifetime average. 
Note that each specification controls for differences in the probability of dissenting due 
to years of experience. Thus, we interpret the point estimate on chief judge status as an 
effect of the institutional role as chief rather than the effect of experience. This result 
suggests that studies of the assignment power at the Supreme Court might indeed be 
contaminated by a “chief justice effect” (i.e., the chief might exert influence through 
channels other than opinion assignment). 
The results in Column 4 allow us to rule out the possibility that the effect of 
presiding judge status on the probability of dissent is driven by the fact that the 
presiding judge tends to be the most experienced member of the panel. With the 
inclusion of a variable that identifies the most experienced member of the panel, the 
effect of presiding judge status appears to be even more pronounced. Moreover, the 
effect of being the most experienced panel member on the probability of dissent is 
positive—contrary to the result we might expect if junior judges on the panel deferred 
to the preferences of their most senior colleague.  
 
C. Effect of Assignment Power 
We investigate the extent to which the assignment power rather than status as 
the presiding judge is driving the lower dissent rate among presiding judges. Table 3 
presents the results, which differ from Table 2 in two important ways. First, in each of 
the columns we include the indicator for whether the presiding judge holds the 
assignment power, A. Second, in Column 4, we include the indicator for whether the 
presiding judge holds the strong form of the assignment power, S.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on the assignment power in each 
column is large, negative, and statistically significant. Contrast this with the coefficient 
on presiding judge status, which is weakly positive in most specifications. Together, the 
results suggest that the negative effect of presiding judge status on dissent observed in 
Table 2 is driven through the assignment power. The estimate on the assignment power 
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in Column 3 suggests that the judges are 29% less likely to dissent as a result of the 
assignment power (-0.0033 from a baseline of 0.0114).  
The results in Column 4 offer evidence that not only the presence of the 
assignment power but the strength of the assignment power matters. Part of the large 
point estimate on the assignment power in Column 3 was driven by the effect of the 
assignment power in circuits with the strong form (i.e., circuits that allow the presiding 
judge to assign the panel opinion even when she dissents). With the inclusion of an 
indicator for the stronger form of the assignment power in Column 4, the main effect on 
assignment power decreases relative to Column 3 by roughly 11 basis points. The 
negative coefficient on the indicator for the strong form of the assignment power in 
Column 4 implies that judges with the stronger form of the assignment power are less 
likely to dissent than judges with the weaker form of the assignment power. This result 
is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The coefficients in Column 4 can be interpreted as 
follows: the ability to assign the panel opinion when in the majority decreases the 
probability that a judge will dissent by approximately 19% (-0.0022 from a baseline of 
0.0114), while the ability to assign when in dissent decreases that probability by an 
additional 17% (-0.0019 from a baseline of 0.0014). This is the opposite of what might be 
expected if presiding judges were less likely to dissent so that they can assign the 
majority opinion. The results in Column 4 strongly suggest that the effect observed in 
the previous section is not the result of presiding judges strategically switching their 




Our further analysis focuses on possible pathways that might allow the presiding 
judge to influence case outcomes via the assignment power.  
Strategic Self-Assignment. We first consider whether presiding judges are 
disproportionately likely to write majority opinions. As noted above, such a finding 
would be suggestive of strategic self-assignment. We estimate a series of regressions 
23 
 
similar to that in Equation 1, but where the outcome is an indicator for whether the 
judge wrote the majority opinion. Recall that many opinions are “per curiam” and that 
non-home judges are excluded from the sample, which explains why the average judge 
in the sample writes the majority in only 18% of cases (where one 33% if there were no 
per curium opinions and all judges were home judges).  
Table 4 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the preferred specifications 
from Table 3 but for the outcome of majority opinion writing. In Column 1, we find that 
status as the presiding judge, the chief judge, and the most experienced judge on a 
panel are associated with a 19%, 6%, and 5% increase in the likelihood that the judge 
writes the majority opinion, respectively. Conditional on presiding judge status, chief 
judge status, and relative experience, we find that the assignment power is not 
associated with a higher probability of writing the majority opinion.  
Column 2 adds an indicator for whether a judge enjoys the strong form of the 
assignment power (i.e., ability to assign the panel opinion from dissent). The results 
suggest that judges with the strong form of the assignment power are approximately 
11% less likely to write the majority opinion than other judges, controlling for the 
general effect of presiding judge status and the effect of the weak form of the 
assignment power (-0.021 compared to a baseline of 0.183).  
One possible explanation for this finding is that judges with the strong form of 
the assignment power have the option of dissenting while simultaneously assigning the 
majority opinion to the most ideologically sympathetic co-panelist. Judges with a weak 
form of the assignment power lack this option—and so are more likely to join the 
majority opinion and self-assign. Recall, though, that in Column 4 of Table 3, we saw 
that judges with the strong form of the assignment power are even less likely to dissent 
than judges with the weak form. Thus, even if strategic voting by judges with a weak 
form of the assignment power occurs in some circumstances, the phenomenon is not so 
prevalent as to offset the other factors driving a lower dissent rate among judges with 
strong-form assignment power.  
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In Column 3, we consider whether the effect of the assignment power on the 
probability of writing the panel opinion is larger for judges in the ideological minority. 
The estimate on the interaction between assignment power and ideological minority 
status in Column 3 is weakly negative. This finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3 
and with the story of strategic self-assignment that Hypothesis 3 reflects. In the 
circumstances that we might expect judges with the assignment power to be more likely 
to self-assign, they appear to be—if anything—less likely.  
All in all, the results in Table 4 provide very little evidence that assigning judges 
exert control over case outcomes through strategic self-assignment. The assignment 
power is not associated with a higher rate of majority opinion writing, and we find no 
indication of a higher rate of self-assignment among judges in the ideological minority. 
While we cannot rule out the possibility of strategic self-assignment in a subset of cases, 
we do not find evidence indicating a consistent pattern of strategic self-assignment. 
  
Strategic Assignment to Other Panel Members. Finally, we investigate whether 
judges with the assignment power exert influence over case outcomes through strategic 
assignment of majority opinions to other panel members. Specifically, we assess 
whether judges with the assignment power are less likely than other judges to dissent 
even when not the majority opinion author. We restrict the sample to votes of judges 
who did not write the majority opinion, and test whether non-authoring judges with the 
assignment power are less likely to dissent than other non-authoring judges.  
Table 5 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the preferred specifications 
from Table 3 but with the sample restricted to non-authoring judges (i.e., judges other 
than the writers of majority opinions). Column 1 suggests that non-authoring judges 
with the assignment power are approximately 29% less likely to dissent than other non-
authoring judges (-0.0039 against a baseline of 0.0134). This finding is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4 above. The fact that the assignment power is associated with a lower 
dissent rate among non-authoring judges suggests that strategic assignment of opinions 
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to other panel members drives part of the lower dissent rate among assigning judges 
overall. 
Column 2 adds an indicator for the strong form of the assignment power, and 
suggests that non-authoring judges with the strong form of the assignment power are 
less likely to dissent than non-authoring judges with the weaker form of the assignment 
power. The strong form of the assignment power is associated with a 19% reduction in 
the rate of dissent among non-authoring judges (-0.0026 from a baseline of 0.0134). This 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 5. A judge with the stronger form of the assignment 
power has the ability to control case assignments in a larger set of cases, and so we 
might expect such a judge to exert greater influence over co-panelists than a judge with 
a weaker form of the assignment power can. 
In Column 3, we consider whether the effect of the assignment power on the 
dissent rate of non-authoring judges is stronger for non-authoring judges in the 
ideological minority. The estimate on the interaction between assignment power and 
ideological minority status is negative, but with a relatively large standard error. We 
interpret this as suggestive but not definitive evidence that the effect of the assignment 
power on the dissent rate of non-authoring judges is strongest in the very cases that we 
would expect the assignment power to matter most: when the judge with the 
assignment power is in the ideological minority.  
  
5. CONCLUSION 
 In this article, we investigated whether the assignment power allows judges to 
wield disproportionate influence over case outcomes. We first found that the presiding 
judge on a three-judge panel is less likely than other panel members to dissent, which 
can be interpreted as indicating that the presiding judge is more likely to be satisfied 
with the outcome reached. We found that this effect is distinguishable from the effect of 
chief judge status and that it is not explained simply by the fact that the presiding judge 
is generally the most experienced panel member. 
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 We next considered whether the effect of presiding judge status on case 
outcomes is attributable to the assignment power or to other aspects of presiding. We 
took advantage of a natural experiment made possible by the Fourth Circuit’s unique 
rules regarding opinion assignment. If the assignment power were the source of the 
presiding judge’s influence over case outcomes, then we would not expect presiding 
judges on the Fourth Circuit (other than the chief judge) to exhibit a lower propensity to 
dissent. Consistent with that expectation, we found that presiding judges without the 
assignment power are no less likely to dissent than other panel members. The effect of 
presiding judge status on dissent appears to be a function of the assignment power and 
not any other effect of presiding judge status.  
 We then exploited a further difference in assignment rules across circuits: the fact 
that presiding judges in five circuits can assign the panel opinion even when in dissent 
while presiding judges in seven other circuits can assign the panel opinion only when in 
the majority. We found that the negative effect of the assignment power on dissent 
probability is greatest for judges who wield a stronger form of the assignment power 
(i.e., who have the ability to assign the panel opinion from dissent). This finding served 
to dispel the notion that presiding judges are less likely to dissent so that they can 
assign the panel opinion. 
 We then sought to determine whether judges with the assignment power wield 
influence over case outcomes through strategic self-assignment or strategic assignment 
of opinions to other panel members. We found little evidence of strategic self-
assignment but stronger evidence that assigning judges exert influence over case 
outcomes through strategic assignment of opinions to other panel members. Judges 
with the assignment power are more likely than other panel members to join the 
majority when not the authoring judge, and this effect is greatest for judges with a 
stronger form of the assignment power. 
 Overall, our results indicate that certain court of appeals judges can wield 
disproportionate influence over case outcomes by virtue of their control over opinion 
assignment. These results suggest that observers of multimember courts should pay 
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close attention to the hierarchical relationship among panel members as well as the 
ideological composition of panels. Our results also suggest that subtle differences in 
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Table 4: Assignment of Opinion Writing
Wrote Majority Opinion
(1) (2) (3)
Assignment Power -0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Preside 0.034!!! 0.035!!! 0.035!!!
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ideological Minority on Panel -0.016!!! -0.016!!! -0.015!!!
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Chief Judge 0.011!! 0.009!! 0.009!!
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Most Experienced Judge on Panel 0.009!!! 0.009!!! 0.009!!!
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Strong-Form Assignment Power -0.021!!! -0.021!!!
(0.004) (0.004)
Assignment Power -0.004
! Ideological Minority on Panel (0.004)
Covariates
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes
N 334,551 334,551 334,551
Dep Var Mean 0.183 0.183 0.183
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.! p< 0.1, !! p< 0.05, !!! p< 0.01. Stan-
dard errors clustered by case. Presiding judges other than the chief judge do
not hold the assignment power in the Fourth Circuit. In the First, Second,
Third, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits, the next ranking judge in
the majority assigns the panel opinion when the presiding judge dissents. In
the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the presiding judge as-
signs the majority opinion even when she dissents (ÒStrong-Form Assignment
PowerÓ).
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Assignment Power -0.0039!! -0.0024 -0.0021
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Preside 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Ideological Minority on Panel 0.0100!!! 0.0100!!! 0.0106!!!
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Chief Judge -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0015
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Most Experienced Judge on Panel 0.0028!!! 0.0028!!! 0.0028!!!
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Strong-Form Assignment Power -0.0026!! -0.0026!!
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Assignment Power -0.0018
! Ideological Minority on Panel (0.0015)
Covariates
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes
N 271,373 271,373 271,373
Dep Var Mean 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.! p< 0.1, !! p< 0.05, !!! p< 0.01. Stan-
dard errors clustered by case. The sample is restricted to judge-votes of judges
who do not write the majority opinion. Presiding judges other than the chief
judge do not hold the assignment power in the Fourth Circuit. In the First,
Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits, the next rank-
ing judge in the majority assigns the panel opinion when the presiding judge
dissents. In the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the presid-




Table A1: Inßuence of Presiding on Disagreement (Dissent or Concur)
Dissent or Concur
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preside -0.0038!!! -0.0017!!! -0.0015!! -0.0023!!!
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Ideological Minority on Panel 0.0112!!! 0.0113!!! 0.0113!!! 0.0114!!!
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Chief Judge -0.0025!! -0.0022!
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Most Experienced Judge on Panel 0.0029!!!
(0.0006)
Covariates
Judge FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 334,551 334,551 334,551 334,551
Dep Var Mean 0.0182 0.0182 0.0182 0.0182
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ! p< 0.1, !! p< 0.05, !!! p< 0.01. Standard errors
clustered by case.
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Table A2: Influence of the Assignment Power on Disagreement (Dissent or Concur)
Dissent or Concurrence












(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)








(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Chief Judge -0.0018 -0.0021
!
(0.0012) (0.0012)









Judge FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 334,551 334,551 334,551 334,551
Dep Var Mean 0.0182 0.0182 0.0182 0.0182
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ! p< 0.1, !! p< 0.05, !!! p< 0.01. Standard errors
clustered by case. Presiding judges other than the chief judge do not hold the assignment
power in the Fourth Circuit. In the First, Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal
Circuits, the next ranking judge in the majority assigns the panel opinion when the presiding
judge dissents. In the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the presiding judge
assigns the majority opinion even when she dissents (ÒStrong-Form Assignment PowerÓ).
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Preside 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)







Chief Judge -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0026
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)













⇥ Ideological Minority on Panel (0.0018)
Covariates
Judge FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes
N 271,373 271,373 271,373
Dep Var Mean 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p<0.1, ⇤⇤ p<0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p<0.01. Standard
errors clustered by case. The sample is restricted to judge-votes of judges who
do not write the majority opinion. Presiding judges other than the chief judge
do not hold the assignment power in the Fourth Circuit. In the First, Second,
Third, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits, the next ranking judge in
the majority assigns the panel opinion when the presiding judge dissents. In the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the presiding judge assigns the
majority opinion even when she dissents (“Strong-Form Assignment Power”).
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